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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This chapter considers and assesses various explanations attributed as principal factors of 
the recent Financial Crisis. In particular, it focuses on two principal regulatory tools which 
constitute the basis of the framework promulgated by recent Basel Committee's initiatives, 
that is, Basel III. These two regulatory tools being capital and liquidity requirements. 
 
Various conclusions have been put forward to explain what triggered the recent Financial 
Crisis. This chapter aims to explain why the Basel Committee's liquidity requirements and 
present proposals aimed at addressing liquidity risks, still represent a very modest milestone in 
efforts aimed at addressing challenges in prudential regulation and supervision. Even though 
problems attributed to capital adequacy requirements are considered by many authorities to 
have triggered the recent Crisis, the chapter will highlight how runs on banks are triggered by 
liquidity crises and that liquidity risks cannot be isolated from systemic risks. In so doing, it will 
incorporate the roles assumed by information asymmetries and market based regulation – 
hence elaborate on how market based regulation could serve to address problems which 
trigger liquidity risks. Imperfect knowledge being a factor which is contributory to liquidity crises 
and bank runs, and market based regulation being essential in facilitating disclosure - since 
the Basel Committee's focus on banks and prudential supervision cannot on its own, address 
the challenges encountered in the present regulatory environment. 
 
Furthermore, it will address measures and proposals which could serve as bases for future 
regulatory reforms - as well as criticisms and challenges still encountered by recent Basel 
Committee initiatives. 
 
 
Key Words: capital; liquidity, Basel III, Basel Committee, lender of last resort, banks, 
insurance, securities, information asymmetry, market based regulation, bail outs, 
disclosure, moral hazard, Dodd Frank Act, Financial Crisis. 
 Preparing for Basel IV – Why Liquidity Risks Still Present a 
Challenge to Regulators in Prudential Supervision. 
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Introduction 
 
Two vital prudential regulatory tools which Basel III addresses, namely capital and liquidity 
requirements, are considered to be instrumental in triggering the first of two types of crises 
(banking crises). These crises, as identified by Lastra and Wood, are banking crises 2 and 
financial crises. 3 Even though various factors have been put forward as constituting 
principal contributory factors to the recent Crisis, 4 the need to address liquidity 
requirements and particularly liquidity risks, – along with the role which market based 
regulation can assume to achieve this aim, will constitute the recurring theme of this 
chapter. 
 
The definition of liquidity, as provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), is “the 
ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without 
incurring unacceptable losses. The fundamental role of banks in the maturity transformation of 
short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, 
both of an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as a whole.” 5 
 
A liquidity crisis is considered to be „the classic type of banking crisis whereby a bank for 
some reason, cannot meet all its payment obligations.“ 6 The role played by imperfect 
knowledge in triggering such a crisis is further elaborated. In this sense, bank runs are 
triggered as a result of such „imperfect knowledge which customers have of their banks, 
and the links through the interbank market and payment system.“ 7 
 
The ECB’s Financial Stability Review, identifies the fact that “the specific knowledge that banks 
possess about their borrowers make bank loans particularly illiquid.” 8 The connection between 
liquidity and systemic risks is further highlighted in the Review where it elaborates on possible 
consequences resulting from a bank’s failure, namely: 9 The “destruction” of such specific 
knowledge which banks have about their borrowers and the reduction of “the common pool of 
liquidity.” 10 Such reduction in the common pool of liquidity may also trigger the failure of other 
banks – with the result that i) the value of such illiquid bank assets diminishes and ii) further 
 
1  Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com, North West University. Final version submitted to publisher April 2016  
2 „Which affect the money stock and thus threaten the economy“; RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 
– 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of International Economic Law 13(3) 531-550 at page 531   
3  „Which may destroy wealth but do not endanger the economy as a whole“; ibid. 
4 Those identified by Lastra and Wood include easy money, excessive leverage, risk management failures, bad 
lending, too big to fail policies, inadequate supervision and ill thought out regulation; see ibid.  
5 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision Sept 2008 at 
page 1 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm> 
6 See RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of 
International Economic Law 13(3) at pages 531 and 532 
7  Ibid  
8 “The Concept of Systemic Risk” Financial Stability Review December 2009  
http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/ivbfinancialstabilityreview200912en.pdf?  
a3fef6891f874a3bd40cd00aef38c64f at page 137  
9 ibid  
10  ibid 
problems within the banking systems are aggravated. 11 
 
In their report on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring and 
Funding Liquidity Risk”, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) noted that at the onset of the 
recent financial crises, the complex response of financial institutions to deteriorating 
market conditions, was to a large extent, attributed to liquidity shortfalls which reflected “on 
and off balance sheet maturity mismatches and excessive levels of leverage.” 12  
For these reasons, even though it has been concluded that “the first crisis of the century was a 
capital crisis – not a liquidity crisis”, 13 this chapter advocates for greater attention to be accorded 
to the topic “liquidity”, as well as measures aimed at addressing liquidity shortfalls - such 
importance being attributed to their contributory roles in triggering systemic and resulting banking 
crises. Furthermore the chapter highlights why greater focus on insurance and securities regulation 
is required since the most effective tools in addressing systemic risk, to a greater extent, will 
require the implementation of market based regulation. In addressing some issues which may 
constitute some areas of consideration in future Basel reforms, the first section not only 
commences with a consideration of the importance of the role of the lender of last resort in liquidity 
crises, but also consideration of the need to incorporate the role which central banks are capable 
of assuming as lenders of last resort in Basel Liquidity Risk Measurements. From this perspective, 
even though it may not be feasible to incorporate such function in Basel liquidity risk 
measurements, this provides a suitable forum for the consideration of how market based regulation 
could contribute in assisting to mitigate situations whereby moral hazard could arise. 
 
 
A discussion of the need for greater extension of regulation to the securities and insurance 
industries will not only constitute the topic of discussion in section two, but also partly 
serve as justification for facilitating market based regulation. The role played by non bank 
institutions in triggering the recent Financial Crisis also serves as further evidence and 
justification for the need for greater focus in extending regulation to the insurance and 
securities sectors. Furthermore, the section will highlight and elaborate on the links 
between moral hazard, market based regulation, transparency and disclosure. 
 
A brief analysis of other criticisms which have arisen – as well as challenges presented by 
recent Basel initiatives, will be provided under section three before a conclusion is drawn. 
 
 
The Importance of the Role of the Lender of Last Resort and Liquidity Crises.  
 
 
Two quotations are considered by Lastra and Wood as providing the best clarification to i) 
how a lender of last resort operation by the central bank can stop a liquidity crisis, and ii) 
what constitutes a liquidity crisis. 
 
The first of these makes reference to Thornton's 1802 quotation: 14 
 
 
 
11 ibid   
12 Report of the Financial Stability Forum on “Addressing Pro cyclicality in the Financial System: Measuring 
and Funding Liquidity Risk”  http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf at page 24   
13 See RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of 
International Economic Law 13(3) at page 535.  
14 See RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of 
International Economic Law 13(3) at page 532 and also see H Thornton, An Enquiry into the Nature 
and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (London: J Hatchard and F and C Rivington, 1802)  
 If any bank fails, a general run upon the neighbouring banks is apt to take place, 
which if not checked, in the beginning by a pouring into the circulation of a very 
large quantity of gold, leads to a very extensive mischief. 
 
 
The second relates to Bagehot's quotation - which is as follows:  15 
 
 What is wanted and what is necessary to stop a panic is to diffuse the impression 
that though money may be dear, money is still to be had.“ 
 
One shortcoming of the Basel Committee in its recent proposals which relate to liquidity risk 
measurements 16, as identified by Scott 17 is its “failure to factor in the role of central banks as 
lenders of last resort.” Even though he highlights the Basel Committee's acknowledgement of 
the fact that particular runs 18 are less likely for certain institutions (where a deposit base and 
deposit insurance exists) 19 than is the case for institutions with greater wholesale funding, he 
also adds that the likelihood of runs occurring in the case of banks with a high percentage of 
liabilities in deposits still exists – this being attributed to either limited deposit insurance 
amounts or irrational depositors. Where such circumstances arise, that is, where limited 
deposit insurance amounts or irrational depositors exist, such circumstances, in his opinion, 
provide the opportunity whereby central banks have functioned as lenders of last resort to 
banks which are able to “post adequate collateral.” He however criticises the Basel 
Committee's failure to factor such possibility or fact in its calculations. 20 
 
The role of market based regulation in mitigating excessive risk taking levels – hence addressing 
risks posed by irrational depositors or negligent management comes into play. Furthermore, the 
need to adequately and promptly discern those banks which should be provided with assistance 
from lender of last resort arrangements – hence avoiding moral hazard is of primary importance. 
The Basel Committe's recent initiatives in amending Pillar III reflect its efforts in facilitating market 
discipline. Its recent amendments to Pillar 3 of Basel II, include a statement that “banks need to 
make disclosures that reflect their real risk profile as markets evolve over time”, are aimed at 
strengthening guiding principles of Pillar 3 (as provided for under paragraph 809). 21 
 
Other measures aimed at enhancing disclosure requirements relate to areas which include 
“securitisation exposures in the trading book and sponsorship of off balance sheet vehicles.” 
22 
 
15 See RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of 
International Economic Law 13(3) at page 533 and W Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the 
Money Market (London: Henry S King & Co, 1873)   
16 Basel Committe on Banking Supervision, „International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, 
Standards and Monitoring“, (December 2009) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165.pdf>  
17 See H Scott „Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation“ Journal of 
International Economic Law 13(3) at page 772   
18 Runs on banks caused by the insolvency of other banks  
19 Hence justifying the fact that banks have not traditionally been required to retain sufficient liquidity to 
survive a run on banks caused by the insolvency of other banks   
20 In this sense Scott is referring to the Basel Committee's liquidity proposal of December 2009, whereby 
two objectives were formulated: (i) „that banks should have sufficient high quality liquid resources to 
survive anacute stress scenario lasting one month, formalized in a Liquidity Coverage Ratio and (ii) that 
banks should have stable funding in the longer term, formalized in a Net Stable Funding Ratio.“  
21 See Consultative Document of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Proposed Enhancements to the 
Basel II Framework January 2009” < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs150.pdf> and the finalised proposals for 
enhancing the Basel II framework : “Enhancements to the Basel II Framework” July 2009 – particularly 
“Changes to the Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements” at page 29 < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf>   
22 See Summary of Impact Assessment document amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, 
securitization issues and remuneration policies – particularly section 5.3 on “Disclosure of Securitization Risks”   
at page 5 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/summary_en.pdf>  
According to the Summary of the Impact Assessment Document, such amendments are not only 
aimed at improving investors’ understanding of risk profiles of banks, but also aimed at reinforcing 
bank risk management incentives – by allowing market participants to exercise discipline. 23 
 
Just as the exercise of discipline by market participants could serve as an impediment to excessive 
risk taking levels, conversely, moral hazard serves as an impediment to market based regulation. 
The capacity of deposit insurance to serve as an impediment to forces of market discipline has 
been highlighted. In illustrating its impact on market discipline, Kaufman states that the substantial 
and easily relatively reduced losses to bank depositors, federal deposit insurance corporation, loan 
customers and users of the payments system – as well as the reduction in levels of bank failures 
(generally), may result in the potential for “even temporary disruptions in either bank-loan customer 
relations or the payments system (through increasing capital requirements and enforcing prompt 
regulatory corrective intervention and least cost resolution provisions).” 24 
 
Further means whereby excessive levels of risk taking could be controlled have been advocated. 
These include the implementation of financial taxes as means of enhancing the regulation of 
financial markets. 25 Financial taxes are considered to have three main objectives: (i) „to limit 
excessive risk-taking, (ii) to provide an insurance or resolution fund for systemically important 
institutions and (iii) to help pay for global public goods.“ It is also emphasized that these three 
objectives are separable, both in their economic rationale and in practice. 26 
 
Kern distinguishes between the FSC (Financial Stability Contribution) which he highlights 
as being primarily designed as an insurance fund to pay retrospectively for the resolution 
or bailout of a large systemically important or too-interconnected-to-fail bank or financial 
institution and, the FAT (Financial Activities Tax) – which he highlights as being primarily 
applied prospectively to deter excessive risk-taking. 27 
 
His criticism of the bank balance sheet tax is that it will fail to deter banks from engaging in 
excessive risk-taking and will not generate adequate revenue to pay for a resolution fund 
because most banks will avoid the tax by shifting risky assets and liabilities off balance 
sheet to affiliates and related entities located outside the taxing jurisdiction and that such 
weaknesses of the proposed bank balance sheet tax suggest that policy-makers should 
consider the merits of a FTT (Financial Transaction Tax) that would be applied by national 
governments and collected by banks and dealers. 28 
 
 
 
23 ibid   
24 “Such provisions”, in Kaufman’s opinion, “attempt to mimic forces of market discipline in an insured depositor 
environment.” GG Kaufman “Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence” Journal of Financial Services 
Research Volume 8 No 2 at page 143 and 144; For further information on the impact of deposit insurance on market 
discipline, see M Ojo, „The need for government and central bank intervention in financial regulation: Free banking 
and the challenges of information uncertainty.“  http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23298/ at page 6 of 15 and  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624918 at page 5   
25 See A Kern, „International Regulatiory Reform and Financial Taxes“ Journal of International Economic 
Law (13) 3 and particularly page 894.  
26 „The first objective, limiting excessive risk-taking, is derived from the desire to price risk efficiently. In this case, 
how the funds are used subsequently is not of primary concern. Second, the proposition that such funds might 
be used to build an insurance fund is an entirely separate argument related not to mitigating the riskiness of 
financial transactions but to pricing accurately the implicit insurance provided to institutions deemed too big or 
too inter-connected to fail. The provision of assistance to those most affected by ill-chosen risk-taking is a third 
component of an efficient pricing strategy. Hence the objective of efficient pricing may be pursued by adopting 
all three goals at once, or by pursuing them separately.“ Ibid   
27 Ibid at page 896   
28 Ibid at page 897  
 
The Extension of Regulation to the Insurance and Securities Industry  
 
As stated in a previous paper, 29 there is growing justification for greater measures aimed at 
extending capital rules to the securities markets. This not only arises from increased 
conglomeration and globalisation – which increases risks attributed to systemic contagion, but 
also the fact that „the globalisation of financial markets has made it possible for investors and 
capital seeking companies to switch to lightly regulated or completely unregulated markets.” 
 
 
 
In his paper, Scott argues that two of the most important policies for dealing with systemic 
risk are namely: the imposition of capital requirements (or limits on leverage) and the use 
of market discipline in calibrating, enforcing and regulating these requirements. 30 
 
Furthermore he adds that „Without eliminating all but assured bailouts for systemically 
important institutions, creditors will not adequately police financial institution’s capital. And, 
without the right information, the market will be unable to estimate the right amount of capital.“ 
 
The importance of addressing moral hazard, its impact on market discipline and the need for 
greater transparency in financial regulation is thus emphasised again. Interestingly enough, 
whilst transparency is essential in facilitating disclosure and the right information, it is also 
considered to facilitate moral hazard. 31 Kaufmann and Weber argue that amongst those 
reasons put forward as the basis for limiting regulatory transparency, the first phenomenon is 
the risk of moral hazard. „On the one hand, an investor will undoubtedly have an interest in 
knowing the consequences in the case that a financial institution becomes insolvent. From his 
or her perspective, any guarantee that potential losses will be covered by the state or 
insurance contributes to certainty. On the other hand, from an economic perspective, 
insolvent— in contrast to ‘only’ illiquid—financial institutions must not be rescued.“ 32 
 
Transparency, in their view, could however achieve its aim of „anchoring financial 
regulation within the constitutional framework“ through the establishment of clear 
responsibilities and procedures - thereby reducing moral hazard. 33 
 
The “conventional justification” for regulation within the securities market is attributed to 
the fact that “exchanges on securities markets lead to external effects (for non participating 
and therefore non-considered third parties)”. 34Consequently public interest arises – which 
is aimed at “protecting potentially disadvantaged parties” (owing to reasons attributed to 
market structure and information asymmetry). 35 
 
 
29 See M Ojo, „The Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Risks and Risk Taking Incentives“< 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1547023> and  http://mpra.ub.uni- 
muenchen.de/20404/1/MPRA_paper_20404.pdf at page 5 of 17  
30 See H Scott „Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation“ Journal of 
International Economic Law 13(3) at page 763  
31 For further information on the need to limit regulatory transparency because of moral hazard, see C 
Kaufmann and R Weber, Transparency: „Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation“ Journal of 
International Economic Law at page 784.   
32 „Concerns about moral hazard are one of the reasons why many countries and the European Union (EU) 
decided not to publish, or not even to establish, rules on which an institution would act as a lender of last 
resort and under what conditions.“ ibid   
33 Ibid at page 787   
34 See „Securities Market Regulation: International Approaches“ Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly 
Report January 2006 at page 36  
35 ibid  
The role played by non bank institutions in triggering the recent Financial Crisis also 
serves as evidence and justification for the need for greater focus in extending regulation 
to the insurance and securities sectors. The need by the Basel Committee, the Financial 
Stability Forum and the G20 to address future runs which could still be caused by liquidity 
problems experienced at non-banks, including hedge funds, has been highlighted. 36 
 
 
Transparency 
 
Even though information asymmetry could be considered to constitute a greater basis for 
regulation within the securities markets, the existence of information asymmetry within the 
banking sector also has the potential to generate systemic effects within the banking 
sector – consequences whose effects, it could be said, could have greater repercussions 
than if such were to originate from within the securities markets. 
 
Principles for transparency, as established under constitutional law, are also regarded by 
Kaufmann and Weber as being applicable to financial regulation. A comprehensive , rule-
based – rather than a purely process-oriented approach, which also implies a three 
dimensional concept of transparency 37 in financial regulation, is proposed. 38 
 
Their proposed first dimension refers to institutional aspects, i.e. procedures and decision making. 
These two elements, in their view, having already been identified in a similar way, especially in the 
context of internet transparency, yet within a conceptually different framework.“ 39 
 
By providing legal certainty, transparency in their opinion, serves as an anchor for financial 
regulation - „the basis for establishing trust, which is the key element of any financial system.“ 
 
According to their second dimension, transparency is understood as „the substantive backbone of 
financial regulation which lays open the values and goals of financial policy and regulation“. 40 
 
The third dimension refers to the accountability of actors as an „essential element for 
rebuilding confidence in the financial system.“ 41 
 
36 Even though the conversion of US investment banks to banks serves to diminish the scope issue with the Basel 
rules, Scott also argues that the major overall problem in the Basel Committee’s approach to both capital and 
liquidity is that its requirements only focused on banks. He makes reference to the recent crisis and the fact 
banks are not the only institutions that can trigger or be the victims of a liquidity crisis. „The assisted acquisition 
of Bear Stearns, the conservatorship of AIG, and the failure of the Reserve Primary Fund, a money market 
fund, triggered liquidity runs whose victims included, but were not limited to, banks. See H Scott „Reducing 
Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation“ Journal of International Economic Law at page 773  
37 C Kaufmann and R Weber, Transparency: „Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation“ Journal of 
International Economic Law at page 779.  
38 Ibid at page 781.  
39 See ibid at page 779; Further, this constitutional dimension, in their view, defines the procedures and institutions by 
which financial markets are being regulated.A key issue and illustrative example provided by them in this regard is 
the too-big-to-fail problem in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Financial regulation in their opinion, needs to „define 
the applicable procedures for addressing this problem as well as the competent institutions.“ Further, „this requires a 
political decision which, regardless of its content, needs to be made transparent. From a transparency perspective, it 
is thus irrelevant whether a country opts for a ‘political’ solution by involviere parliament or prefers to take a ‘technical’ 
approach by engaging supervisory authorities and the central bank. The key is that whatever decision is made it is 
laid open and thus fosters credibility of the system as a whole.“see ibid at page 796   
40 This second dimension is elaborated on as having two aspects: making the objectives and underlying 
values of public financial policy transparent whilst ensuring that information is both accessible and 
comprehensible. The essential element being quality, not quantity, of information. A current example 
provided in this context is the transparency of central bank objectives. See ibid at page 796  
41 This dimension, in their opinion, also addresses accountability as another important aspect of good governance. 
„Given the variety of actors and the multitude of standards applicable to financial markets, ensuring accountability  
 
Other Criticisms and Challenges Presented by Recent Basel Reforms  
 
Recent Basel reforms relating to liquidity risk measurements and risk weightings have 
experienced their fair share of criticisms – as partly illustrated under section one. Furthermore, 
section two highlights why criticisms have arisen as a result of the Basel Committee's focus on 
the banking sector. The reliability of credit ratings (in view of the recent Financial Crisis) as 
means of determining risk weights, basic reforms relating to securitisation (as effective from 
December 2010), and the impediment faced by the Basel reforms which relate to 
securitizations and resecuritizations as presented by the Dodd Frank Act 42(which prevents US 
regulators from relying on credit ratings in any regulation – thus making the implementation of 
Basel reforms relating to securitization and resecuritizations impossible), have also been 
highlighted.  43 Whilst consistency and reliability with its measurements constitutes an issue 
which the Basel Committee needs to address, 44 enforcement is also another in need of 
redress. A system geared towards a more rule based approach would definitely foster greater 
accountability than a principles based approach to regulation. 
 
As well as the consideration of the adequacy and effectiveness of recently proposed liquidity 
measures, the transition period for the implementation of such rules has also proved to be a 
contentious topic. As highlighted in a previous paper, whilst some elements of the recent 
announcements relating to the new framework (for Basel III) are considered by certain 
jurisdictions to be disappointing - owing to the fact that more stringent definitions for capital 
had been expected, the phase in periods have been welcomed by several jurisdictions. 45 
 
Conclusion 
 
Macro prudential regulation (as the most effective means of addressing systemic risk and 
maintaining financial stability) and the need for greater focus on liquidity risk related measures and 
 
needs to be addressed from different perspectives. The concept proposed here is based on the 
distinction between the accountability of states and private actors and their contribution to restoring 
confidence in the financial system. The result is a threefold matrix for transparent financial regulation, 
relating to public and private actors and including the international dimension.“see ibid at 796 
42 The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act  
43 See H Scott,„Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) at pages 766-767. In addition, Scott adds that the risk weighting process is not only 
„methodologically suspect – but also subject to political pressure.“ In this respect he adds :„Can there be 
any other reason why all residential mortgages (prime or subprime) were risk-weighted at 50% in Basel I, 
while all other secured debt to the private sector was risk-weighted at 100%? Indeed, Basel II was even 
worse, dropping the risk-weight on residential mortgages to 35%.  
Clearly, assigning low risk-weights for residential mortgages was part of the strategy of the USA to promote home 
ownership, using risk-weights as a means of credit allocation. In addition, the latest revision to Basel II in July 2009, 
also effective in December 2010, increased capital for market risk (changes in value) of a bank’s trading book. These 
changes also include a stressed value-at-risk (VaR) requirement, which the Committee believes will help dampen 
the cyclicality of the minimum regulatory capital framework. Again, the issue is whether regulators can get these 
capital charges right. While in the past capital requirements seem to have been too low, the risk for the future may be 
that they are too high, which would unnecessarily dampen economic recovery.“ see ibid at pages 766 -767   
44 An interesting observation also highlighted by Scott relates to the different levels of leverage requirements for 
depository banks – when compared to investment banks (which do not take deposits) – the leverage levels of 
deposit banks being much lower than those of investment banks. See ibid at page 766.   
45 For further information on this, as well as the impact of phase in periods on „silent participations“, see M Ojo, 
„Basel III and Responding to the Recent Financial Crisis: Progress made by the Basel Committee in relation to 
the Need for Increased Bank Capital and Increased Quality of Loss Absorbing Capital“  http://mpra.ub.uni- 
muenchen.de/25291/ and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680886  
tools constitute recurring themes from the recent crisis. In agreement with Miles 46, capital 
requirements, and explicit limits on gearing constitute more direct means of controlling leverage. 
Basel reforms (and Basel III in particular) have evolved considerably to address capital 
requirements. „Financial stability, could be preserved by directing policy instruments at debt 
gearing (or leverage) – and with banks, this could be achieved through a prevention in the initial 
(limited) fall in the value of assets and by ensuring that banks are able to withstand falls in asset 
values through sufficient loss absorbing capital – rather than expecting monetary policy (changes 
in interest rates) to substantially reduce asset price variability.“ 47 Other proposals have been 
highlighted as the way forward, in achieving the goal of maintaining financial stability. 48 
 
The role of market based regulation in mitigating excessive risk taking levels – hence addressing 
risks posed by irrational depositors or negligent management, not only serves as a means of 
addressing the problem of moral hazard, but also serves as a means whereby accountability could 
be fostered (through greater transparency and facilitation of disclosure requirements). Even though 
it is argued that the limitation of regulatory transparency serves a basis for limiting moral hazard, 
transparency, it is further argued (and less contentiously), could achieve its aim of „anchoring 
financial regulation within the constitutional framework“ through the establishment of clear 
responsibilities and procedures - thereby reducing moral hazard. 
 
To conclude, market based regulation serves as a means of addressing the rationale for 
financial regulation – which embodies two issues; namely, the issue related to systemic 
risks and that related to information asymmetry. Market based regulation would not only 
help address problems attributed to systemic risks and excessive risk taking levels, but 
also information asymmetries – hence addressing liquidity risks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 See D Miles, „Leverage and Monetary Policy“, Speech by David Miles, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of 
the Bank of England at the Economic and Social Research Institute Foundation for Fiscal Studies, 12 October 2010 
at page 9 < http://www.bis.org/review/r101018e.pdf> and M Ojo, The Role of Monetary Policy in Matters Relating to 
Financial Stability: Monetary Policy Responses Adopted During the Most Recent Financial Crisis  http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/26925/ and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713647  
47 ibid  
48 These include: (i) increased integration of banking, securities and insurance supervision ; (ii) transferring the 
macro-prudential supervisory function to the central bank; (iii) articulation of the relation between macro- and 
micro-supervisors through a management by exception system involving direct authority of the macro-
supervisor over enforcement and allocation of tasks; (iv) given the difficulty of measuring output on supervisory 
tasks, the systemic risk supervisor must necessarily be more accountable and less independent than central 
banks are on their monetary task; (v) the supervisory agency cannot rely on high-powered incentives to 
motivate supervisors, and must rely on culture instead; (vi) the supervisor must limit its reliance on self 
regulation; and (vii) the international system should substitute the current loose, networked structure with a 
more centralized and hierarchical one. See RM Lastra and L Garicano, „Towards a new Architecture For 
Financial Stability : Seven Principles „ Journal of International Economic Law 13(3) at page 597  
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